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Foreign Convictions are Not Proper Predicate
Offenses Under the Statutory Language "Convicted
in Any Court": Small v. United States
INTERNATIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW - FIREARM STATUTE -
WEAPONS - The United States Supreme Court brought confor-
mity to the Circuit Courts of Appeal by holding that the "convicted
in any court" element of a federal firearm statute encompasses
only domestic convictions.
Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
A person "convicted in any court" of an offense punishable by a
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year is prohibited from
possessing a firearm.1 The purpose of this federal regulation is to
prevent potentially dangerous individuals from obtaining guns.2
In 1994, Gary Small (hereinafter "Small"), a United States citi-
zen, was convicted in Japan for attempting to smuggle firearms
into that country and was sentenced to five years' confinement.!
Following his release, Small returned to Pennsylvania, where he
purchased a firearm from a federally licensed dealer.' A federal
grand jury indicted Small and charged him with (1) falsely repre-
senting to a federally authorized gun dealer that he had never
been convicted of a crime punishable by a sentence exceeding one
year, and (2) knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition
subsequent to his previous conviction.5 Small filed a motion to
1. Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1754 (2005). The federal statute provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ... possess... any firearm or
ammunition .... " 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
2. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758.
3. Id. at 1754.
4. United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 756 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
5. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57. The federal government contended that Small
violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), (g)(1) (2000). Id. at 757. Section 922(a)(6) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in connection with the acquisition or at-
tempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from a. . . licensed dealer
•.. knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement... in-
tended or likely to deceive such ... dealer.., with respect to any fact material
to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition
under the provisions of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).
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dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statutory language "con-
victed in any court" does not apply to foreign convictions.6
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania denied Small's motion.' In his memorandum order,
Judge Cindrich analyzed the decisions of the only three circuit
courts of appeals to have addressed the "convicted in any court"
language of § 922.8 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits reasoned that a
person who commits serious crimes in a foreign country is not less
dangerous than a person who commits crimes within the United
States; therefore, the statutory language "convicted in any court"
should apply to convictions entered in foreign courts.9 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the language of § 922 to be am-
biguous and applied the rule of lenity.'i Judge Cindrich decreed
that "'[any' court means any court and there is nothing in the
plain and unambiguous language of Section 922 indicating that
Congress intended to exclude foreign convictions from such a
broad term.""
Upon the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, Small
entered a guilty plea, conditioned upon the reservation of his right
to challenge the conviction on the ground that § 922 was inappli-
cable to foreign convictions.2 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the district court.
13
6. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 757. In the alternative, Small argued that even if convic-
tions entered in foreign courts are deemed applicable under § 922, the Japanese conviction
is not a valid predicate offense because the foreign court ignored protections promised by
the United States Constitution. Id. The United States Supreme Court did not analyze this
issue upon its grant of certiorari. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754.
7. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
8. Id. at 757-59. The decisions of the courts of appeals are not from the Third Circuit,
so they merely acted as persuasive authority. Id. at 757. Compare United States v. Con-
cha, 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000) (foreign convictions are not covered by the language of§
922), with United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989) (conviction in an English
court was a valid predicate offense), and United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.
1986) (the statutory phrase "convicted in any court" included Argentine and Swiss convic-
tions).
9. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 757-59 (citing Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96; Winson, 793 F.2d
at 758).
10. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (citing Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256). The rule of lenity
is "[tihe judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute
that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of
the more lenient punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1359 (8th ed. 2004).
11. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
12. United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2003).
13. Small, 333 F.3d at 426. The Third Circuit only touched upon the meaning of "con-
victed in any court," as its position was that the definitive issue in the case was whether
the Japanese conviction was fundamentally fair under the United States Constitution. Id.
at 427 n.2.
Small v. United States
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the statutory language "convicted in any court" ap-
plies to convictions entered in foreign courts. 4 Justice Breyer de-
livered the majority opinion for the Court" and concluded that the
statute's silence as to foreign convictions and the Court's history of
assuming that statutes only apply domestically, unless specifically
stated otherwise, required the Court to render the language "con-
victed in any court" as applicable solely to convictions entered in
United States courts.
16
Justice Breyer began his analysis by dissecting the statutory
phrase "convicted in any court."7 In particular, he discussed the
application of the word "any."8 The majority acknowledged that
the word "any" requires a broad interpretation, 9 but reasoned that
it must be limited to that which the legislature intended it to ap-
ply.2" Therefore, "any" court includes foreign courts only if it was
the intent of Congress for such courts to be encompassed by the
statute.2'
Justice Breyer noted that the Supreme Court has adopted a le-
gal presumption that Congress intends its statutes to apply do-
mestically, not extraterritorially, unless the language of the stat-
ute specifies otherwise.22 Congress did not intend for § 922 to be
applicable abroad, thus rendering the presumption inapplicable;
however, the majority reasoned that a similar assumption was
appropriate in this matter - as the statute less reliably classifies
14. Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1754 (2005).
15. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1753. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, was joined by
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no
part in the decision of the case. Id. at 1753-54. Justice Thomas authored a dissenting
opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Id. at 1753.
16. Id. at 1758.
17. Id. at 1754.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1755. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) ("[Read natu-
rally, the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind.'" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (3d ed.
1976))).
20. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754-55. See, e.g., Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541
U.S. 125, 132 (2004) ('any' can and does mean different things depending upon the set-
ting"); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 631 (1818) ("[Gleneral words, [such as 'any']
must... be limited.., to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them.").
21. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754-55.
22. Id. at 1755. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). See also
Palmer, 16 U.S. at 631 ("The words 'any person or persons,' are broad enough to compre-
hend every human being. But general words must not only be limited to cases within the
jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply
them.").
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dangerous persons where foreign, rather than domestic, convic-
tions are involved.23 Thus, the Court presumed that "convicted in
any court" applied domestically, unless the statutory language,
history, or objective demonstrated otherwise.24
In accordance with this newly developed presumption, Justice
Breyer assessed the statutory language to determine whether
Congress had intended § 922 to apply to foreign convictions. 25 The
majority read the statutory language as if it included foreign con-
victions in order to provide examples of the discrepancies that
would result.26 Justice Breyer declared that the statute's language
did not suggest an intent by Congress to make it applicable to for-
eign convictions, as Congress probably had not even contemplated
such an application.27
Justice Breyer then examined the legislative history of the stat-
ute to determine whether it expressed the intent of Congress.28
Congress considered a senate bill that would have restricted
predicate offenses to federal crimes punishable by a sentence of
more than one year and crimes established by state law to be felo-
nies, but ultimately rejected that version in favor of the current
statutory language.29  The majority reasoned that Congress's ra-
23. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755-56. Justice Breyer cited multiple foreign statutes that
prohibit conduct that is permitted in the United States of America, thus concluding that
foreign convictions are less reliable for the purpose of identifying harmful individuals. Id.
(citations omitted).
24. Id. at 1756.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1756-57. The possession of a firearm is permitted despite a previous convic-
tion for federal or state antitrust or business regulatory offenses under 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20)(A); therefore, if "convicted in any court" included foreign convictions, this
exception would be inapplicable to foreign antitrust or regulatory convictions. Id. at 1756.
If "convicted in any court" applies to foreign convictions, the legislature caused a senseless
distinction between federal or state misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence under 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), which are sufficient predicate crimes under § 922(g)(9), and similar
foreign convictions that would not be covered by the statute. Id. at 1756-57. 18 U.S.C. §
924(e) prohibits the possession of guns where an individual has three prior convictions for a
serious federal or state drug offense; thus, if "convicted in any court" applies to foreign
convictions, there is a misadvised distinction between crimes committed abroad which are
not subject to the enhanced punishments and those United States convictions which are
subject to the statute. Id. at 1757. If foreign convictions are encompassed by the language
.convicted in any court," then, under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), Congress created another
senseless distinction by permitting individuals with a prior domestic conviction of a mis-
demeanor not punishable by a term of more than two years to possess a gun, while not
making this exception applicable to those convicted of similar offenses in foreign courts.
Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757.
27. Id. at 1756.
28. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757.
29. Id. Compare S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968) (defining the scope of predicate
offenses as applying to federal crimes punishable by a sentence of more than one year and
Small v. United States
tionale was that the current language is simpler and avoids diffi-
culties arising out of the fact that some states may define "felony"
differently."° The Court concluded that the legislative history of
the statute was merely a neutral factor, as it confirmed that Con-
gress did not consider whether the phrase "convicted in any court"
applied to convictions entered in foreign courts.3 '
Justice Breyer completed his analysis by addressing the objec-
tive of § 922.3' The majority acknowledged that the statute's ob-
jective - preventing conceivably dangerous individuals from pos-
sessing weapons - offered support for determining that "con-
victed in any court" included foreign convictions.33 Justice Breyer
conceded that one convicted in a foreign court may well be as
harmful as one convicted domestically; however, as there have
been very few instances of a foreign conviction serving as the
predicate offense in an unlawful possession violation, the strength
of this argument is diminished and actually reinforces the prob-
ability that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions
applied under the statute.'
The majority found that the statute's language, history, and ob-
jective supported the Court's determination that Congress did not
intend "convicted in any court" to apply to foreign convictions and
reversed and remanded the judgment of the Third Circuit.35 Jus-
tice Breyer suggested that Congress could alter this conclusion
through a statutory amendment .
Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the
majority distorted the plain meaning of the statutory language
"convicted in any court." 7 He contended that the terms of the
statute prohibited Small from possessing a firearm in the United
offenses determined by States to be felonies), with H.R. REP. No. 90-1956, at 28-29 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.) (adopting the current statutory language of "convicted in any court, of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year").
30. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1758.
33. Id. (citing Brief for United States at 16, Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752
(2005) (No. 03-750)). The objective of Congress was to "keep guns out of the hands of those
who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becom-
ing a threat to society." Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Insti-
tute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 (1983)). See also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60-62, 66
(1980); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974).
34. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined in his dissenting opinion
by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Id.
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States, as "any court" applied to all courts with the jurisdiction to
38inflict punishment through a sentence of more than one year.
Congress clearly expressed domestic concerns in other statutory
provisions,39 so Justice Thomas found that the statute's lack of
specificity should be considered as including foreign convictions,
as convictions entered in foreign courts exhibit dangerousness just
as accurately as convictions entered in the United States.4 °
Justice Thomas questioned the majority's development of a
canon of statutory interpretation that assumes that a statute only
applies domestically, unless evidence reveals that Congress in-
tended otherwise. 41  He declared that the Court has imposed a
burden on Congress by requiring the legislature to describe every
statute as specifically applying abroad to ensure that the court
will interpret the statute as such.42 Justice Thomas reasoned that
the majority's application and analysis of the well-recognized as-
sumption that federal statutes are meant to apply domestically,
not extraterritorially, lends no support to the creation of this
canon - as the extraterritoriality canon restricts federal law from
applying beyond United States borders, while the Court's creation
restricts federal statutes from addressing conduct within the
United States.43 The dissent also noted that the purpose of the
extraterritoriality canon was to prevent conflict between federal
and foreign laws; however, § 922(g)(1) does not conflict with the
application of foreign laws.44 Justice Thomas agreed that domestic
concerns are the general focus of Congress when legislating, but
38. Id. at 1759-60. Justice Thomas argued that the majority misinterpreted the word
"any" because "[rlead naturally, the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or
some indiscriminately of whatever kind.' Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (3d ed. 1976))).
39. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1760 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)
(2000) (excluding certain "Federal or State offenses" as applicable predicate crimes); 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (2000) (defining misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence through
"Federal or State law").
40. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1760 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1761. The majority developed a legal presumption by stating: "We conse-
quently assume a congressional intent that the phrase "convicted in any court" applies
domestically, not extraterritorially." Id. at 1756 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. The majority, in creating a new canon of statutory interpretation, considered
the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law: "It is a longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id. (quoting
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
44. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1762 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
Small v. United States
argued that the concern at issue - gun possession within the
United States - is a domestic concern; thus, there should be no
presumption concerning this statute.46
Justice Thomas then discussed the majority's contention that
foreign convictions less reliably identify dangerous individuals for
purposes of domestic law. 4' The dissent insisted that the major-
ity's discussion of a few foreign offenses that are inconsistent with
United States constitutional principles offered no support for this
holding. Justice Thomas acknowledged that only a few cases
have addressed § 922(g)(1) where the predicate offense was a for-
eign conviction; nevertheless, he argued that none of the foreign
convictions were found by the majority to be convictions inconsis-
tent with the principles of domestic law.4 Accordingly, Justice
Thomas found that the majority improperly and incorrectly as-
sumed that foreign offenses are not sufficient indicators of dan-
49gerousness.
Justice Thomas then attacked the Court's analysis of the
anomalies created by the statutory language of § 922(g)(1)." The
dissent represented that the anomalies discussed by the majority
were not absurd, as it is not senseless to prohibit foreign offenders
of antitrust or business regulatory crimes from possessing guns,
because it may have been the intent of Congress to exempt only
domestic crimes with which Congress is familiar.51 Discrepancies
are created when dissecting the statute, irrespective of whether it
is construed as including foreign convictions; however, according
to Justice Thomas far more dangerous anomalies would be created
with the statute being construed to exclude foreign convictions.52
Justice Thomas argued that the discrepancies caused by the ma-
jority's holding - permitting those convicted in foreign courts of
45. Small, at 1761-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority and the dissent agreed
that "Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." Id. at 1755 (majority
opinion), 1762 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204
n.5 (1993)).
46. Id. at 1762-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1763.
49. Id.
50. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. Id. Justice Thomas asserted that the anomalies that the majority discussed did not
invoke the canon against absurdities. Id. This canon shall only apply "where the result of
applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite
impossible that Congress could have intended the result.., and where the alleged absurd-
ity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone."). Id. (quoting Public Citizen v. Department
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
52. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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serious crimes to possess guns - would produce such dangerous
conditions that this interpretation could not have been the intent
of Congress when enacting the statute. 3
Justice Thomas concluded his dissent by considering the history
of statutory interpretation, generally, and of § 922(g)(1), specifi-
cally.14 He professed that the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that the function of the court is not to determine
what the legislature's intent would be if it were to consider this
particular case; rather, it is the Court's duty to follow the plain
meaning of the statute.5 He then objected to the majority's find-
ing that the history of the statute is silent.56 Justice Thomas in-
terpreted the history of § 922(g)(1) as influential to his view, as
the legislature's deletion of the references to federal and state
crimes clarifies that their intent was to suggest "that not only fed-
eral and state convictions were meant to be covered."57 Justice
Thomas insisted that this change in language clearly demon-
strates that "any" simply means "any."58
The federal felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm offense was devel-
oped when the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy,
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
prompted Congress to enact the Gun Control Act of 1968.59 The
53. Id. Justice Thomas hypothesized that an individual convicted overseas of dangerous
crimes, such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and terrorism, may possess guns freely in the
United States, while a person convicted within the United States of altering a vehicle iden-
tification number under 18 U.S.C. § 511(a)(1) is prohibited from possessing firearms. Id.
54. Id. at 1764-65.
55. Id. at 1765. Justice Thomas discussed Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368
(1994), where the Court, while interpreting provisions of the federal firearms statutes,
acknowledged that Congress may not have considered certain interpretations of the stat-
ute, but still adhered to the clear meaning of the statute. Id.
56. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. Compare S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968) (defining the scope of predicate of-
fenses as applying to federal crimes punishable by a sentence of more than one year and
offenses determined by States to be felonies), with H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956, at 28-29 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.) (adopting the current statutory language of "convicted in any court, of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year").
58. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act was enacted the day after the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, but was
amended a few months later by the Gun Control Act. United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d
1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545-46 (11th
Cir. 1987) ("The Gun Control Act of 1968 ... was in part a reaction to the assassinations of
President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Medgar Evers." (citing United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)));
United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[Ihe Gun Control
Act of 1968 [was] enacted following the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Robert F. Kennedy."); Alderman v. Bradley, 957 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) ("I7he
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purpose of this legislation was to prevent individuals with crimi-
nal backgrounds from possessing firearms." Congress considered
a senate bill that would have defined predicate offenses as federal
or state convictions punishable by a sentence of more than one
year; however, Congress ultimately abandoned this terminology in
favor of the current language of "convicted in any court.""' This
piece of legislation was codified in Chapter 44 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, but was modified through the enactment of
the Firearm Owners' Protection Act and the Armed Career Crimi-
nal Act.62
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court
to address whether foreign convictions were valid predicate of-
fenses under the language of § 922.63 In United States v. Winson,6
Eric Winson was arrested for failing to disclose his prior Argentin-
ean and Swiss convictions to a federally licensed firearms dealer
when he purchased a rifle and a shotgun.65 Judge Engel, writing
for the court, considered the statute's language to be unambiguous
and its purpose - preventing those likely to be dangerous from
possessing guns - to be clear.66 He then concluded that there was
Federal Gun Control Act was enacted in response to civil disorder and unrest (in the
1960's) which had resulted in the assassination of prominent public figures.") (citing
Kreshesky v. Codd, 391 N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. 1976); H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 4413 (1968),
as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4413).
60. Kreshesky, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 793. "The principal purpose of the Act was 'to curb
crime by keeping firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them
because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.'" Id. (quoting Huddleston v. United
States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)).
61. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
62. RSM, Inc. v. Buckles, 254 F.3d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Firearm
Owners' Protection Act was enacted to amend the Gun Control Act); Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994) (commenting that the Gun Control Act is
codified in Chapter 44 of Title 18); United States v. Gantt, 659 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(discussing that the Armed Career Criminal Act was integrated into the Gun Control Act).
63. United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 755 (6th Cir. 1986). This case was decided
prior to the enactment of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which amended § 922 and was
codified under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); therefore, the opinion of the Winson court consistently
refers to 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1), which at the time included the same "convicted in any court"
language as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does today. United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249,
1251, 1257 n.6 (10th Cir. 2000). Section 922(h)(1) provided that: "It shall be unlawful for
any person ... who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year ... to receive any firearm ... which has been... transported
in . . . foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (Supp. IV. 1964) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
64. 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1986).
65. Winson, 793 F.2d at 756. Winson was convicted in an Argentinean court of possess-
ing counterfeit currency and for fraud in a Swiss court. Id.
66. Id. at 757-58. The court found the language of the statute, when viewed independ-
ently, to be unambiguous. Id. at 757. The court recognized that there are discrepancies
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no congressional intent to exclude foreign convictions from cover-
67age under the statute.
The next appellate court to consider whether foreign convictions
are encompassed by the "convicted in any court" language of § 922
was the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. At-
kins.6' The Court found § 922(g)(1) to be applicable to foreign con-
victions.69 William Atkins, previously convicted in England of
unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, was
convicted domestically of unlawful possession of a firearm.7' The
unanimous court rejected the argument that Congress, unless spe-
cifically detailing otherwise, did not intend the statutory phrase
"any court" to extend to foreign courts.7' The Court found the per-
suasive authority of Winson influential and agreed that the statu-
tory language was unambiguous; thus, the unanimous court re-
jected the application of the rule of lenity.7" Circuit Judge Murna-
ghan concluded by reasoning that the word "any" is all-inclusive,
so the prior English conviction was a proper predicate offense.73
In United States v. Concha," the Tenth Circuit became the first
appellate court to conclude that § 922(g)(1) is inapplicable to for-
eign convictions. 5 Joseph Concha was arrested following an alter-
cation with a police officer and was convicted of possession of a
firearm under § 922(g)(1).16  The government increased his sen-
tence under § 924(e), which incorporates the "convicted in any
between § 922's broad scope and § 1202's limiting language, but the "resolution of the pros
and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress." Id. (quot-
ing United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984)). The limiting language of § 1202 pro-
vides, in relevant part: "Any person who .. .has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony. . ." 18 U.S.C.A. App. §
1202, repealed by Pub. L. 99-308, § 104(b) (1986). The Sixth Circuit then identified the
purpose of the statute and reasoned that "we can perceive no reason why the commission of
serious crimes elsewhere in the world is likely to make the person so convicted less danger-
ous than he whose crimes were committed within the United States." Id. at 758.
67. Id. at 758.
68. 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989).
69. Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96.
70. Id. at 95-96.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 96. The rule of lenity is inapplicable when a statute is unambiguous. Id.
(citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-88 n.10 (1981)).
73. Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96. The court rationalized that an attack upon the statutory
language of § 922(g)(1) should be focused upon the word "court," not the word "any." Id. In
this matter, the conviction occurred in a court in England, the country that provided the
origin of the legal system utilized in the United States; therefore, the conviction in an Eng-
lish court is a proper predicate offense. Id.
74. 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000).
75. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256-57.
76. Id. at 1251.
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court" element of § 922(g)(1), by introducing evidence of his prior
foreign convictions." The majority reasoned that Congress in-
tended "any court" to apply only to federal and state courts, as §
921(20) excludes certain federal and state crimes from the "any
court" designation, but makes no mention of similar foreign
crimes."8 Circuit Judge Ebel offered further support for this con-
clusion by mentioning that the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines provide enhanced sentences to felons in possession of fire-
arms where the felons have been previously convicted of certain
federal or state crimes.79 The majority then reasoned that there is
no assurance that individuals convicted in foreign courts are af-
forded the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion, so the Court declined to hold that foreign convictions are
proper predicate offenses without a clear designation by Congress
otherwise."0
Although the constitutionality of a foreign conviction can be
challenged through a writ of habeas corpus,"1 the Tenth Circuit
found it irrational to require individuals to do so for purposes of
the Armed Career Criminal Act.82 Circuit Judge Ebel concluded
77. Id. Concha had four prior convictions, three of which were foreign convictions, so
the government sought to introduce the prior foreign convictions to increase his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Id. Section 924(e)(1) provides:
In the case of a person who violates § 922(g) of this title and has three previous
convictions by any court referred to in § 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent fel-
ony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from
one another, such person shall be ... imprisoned not less than fifteen years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000).
78. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1253-54. Section 921(a)(20) provides:
The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"
does not include-
(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair
trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to
the regulation of business practices, or
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor
and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000) (emphasis added).
79. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254. The United States Sentencing Guidelines enhance the
term of imprisonment for a felon in possession of firearm where the felon has "prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Id. (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (1998)). The Guidelines limit "crime of violence"
and "controlled substance offense" to "offenses under federal or state law." Concha, 233
F.3d at 1254 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (1998)).
80. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
81. Habeas corpus is "[a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most fre-
quently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
82. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254-55. An individual can challenge a predicate conviction
through a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1254 (citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,
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the majority opinion by discussing the holdings in Atkins and
Winson.83 The majority contended that there are textual argu-
ments and policy reasons both for and against the inclusion of for-
eign convictions in § 924(e), but it concluded that the lack of legis-
lative directive required the court to apply the rule of lenity.'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the final appellate
court to consider whether foreign convictions were absorbed by the
"convicted in any court" language of § 922(g)(1) before the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Small.5 In United States v.
Gayle,8" Rohan Ingram argued that his conviction entered in a Ca-
nadian court should not serve as a predicate offense under §
922(g)(1). 87 Circuit Judge Katzmann, writing the unanimous opin-
ion of the court, began his analysis by dissecting the statutory
language to ascertain whether it is unambiguous.88 He disagreed
512 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1990)).
The court suggested that Congress did not intend to impose the burdens upon an individual
that would be caused by challenging a foreign conviction for purposes of a § 924(e) charge.
Concha, 233 F.3d at 1255. The defendant could be subjected to incarceration while peti-
tioning, even though such individual should not have served any time, and the defendant
would bear the burden of proving that the prior conviction was unconstitutional while the
records of the foreign judicial proceedings may be incomplete. Id.
83. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1255-56 (citing United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1986)).
84. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256. Circuit Judge Ebel reasoned that:
[There is a textual argument that § 924(e) covers foreign convictions ("any"
means any), but there is a competing textual argument that it does not (the
reference in § 921(20) to state and federal crimes). There are policy reasons to
believe that Congress intended to include previous foreign convictions (foreign
criminals are likely to be as dangerous as domestic criminals), but there are
equally strong policy reasons to believe that Congress did not so intend (unfair
foreign convictions can be challenged with difficulty, if at all).
Id. The court concluded by applying the rule of lenity and proclaiming that we "will not
interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an indi-
vidual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Con-
gress intended." Id. (quoting United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Circuit Judge Baldock filed a dissenting opinion where he argued that nothing in the un-
ambiguous language of § 924(e) indicated that Congress intended to exclude foreign convic-
tions from the coverage of the statute. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1257 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
85. United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). The decision of the court in
Gayle was handed down a few months after the ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Small. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 92.
86. 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
87. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 90. Ingram was arrested in a New York hotel for illegally enter-
ing the United States from Canada. Id. Police searched his hotel room and discovered
boxes of firearms, so they charged him with numerous offenses including being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Id. The government sought to use Ingram's Canadian conviction
for using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offense as the requisite predicate
offense under § 922(g)(1). Id. Kirk Gayle and Ann-Marie Richardson were also defendants
in this matter, but only Rohan Ingram filed an appeal. Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 92.
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with the approach taken by the circuit courts in Atkins and Small,
and commented that the analysis of the statutory language should
not merely consider the meaning of the phrase "convicted in any
court," but should consider the phrase within the scheme of the
entire statute as the Tenth Circuit did in Concha.9 The Second
Circuit then analyzed the legislative history of the statute by dis-
cussing that the Senate and Conference Reports on the Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968 contemplated only federal and state convictions
without exhibiting any disagreement over that limitation." Judge
Katzmann concluded by admitting that there are legitimate rea-
sons why Congress would have wanted "convicted in any court" to
include foreign convictions, but he inferred that the legislature's
silence as to the harm that would be caused by the inclusion of
those convictions illustrates that there was no intention to include
them.91 Thus, the Second Circuit proclaimed that "we only choose
not to write into a statute a meaning that seems contrary to what
Congress intended."
92
On April 26, 2005, conformity was brought to the circuits when
the United States Supreme Court ruled in Small.93 Section
922(g)(1) predicate offenses are now uniformly recognized as con-
sisting of only convictions entered domestically.94
Although the United States Supreme Court ended the dispute
among the circuits, Congress is likely to consider Justice Breyer's
suggestion and change the outcome required by the Small decision
through a statutory amendment." A bill to amend § 922(g)(1) was
89. Id. at 92-93.
90. Id. at 94-95. The court analyzed the Senate Judiciary Committee Report because a
committee report is "the most useful document in the legislative history." Id. at 94 (quoting
Abner Mikva, quoted in Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS 171 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988)). The court considered the Conference
Report "[blecause a conference report represents the final statement of terms agreed to by
both houses." Gayle, 342 F.3d at 94-95 (citing Disabled in Action of Metropolitan New
York v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2000)). See S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968);
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956, at 28-29 (1968).
91. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95-96. Congress would have likely wanted to include foreign
convictions to keep firearms out of the hands of felons convicted of crimes of violence, but it
never mentioned foreign convictions throughout the inception of the statute. Id. at 95. Nor
did Congress mention whether, if § 922(g)(1) covered foreign convictions, individuals con-
victed abroad through unjust procedures and of offenses in violation of the United States
Constitution would be prohibited from possessing firearms. Id. at 95-96.
92. Id. at 96.
93. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758.
94. Id.




introduced in the Senate on April 28, 2005 and currently sits be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee.9
In Small, the United States Supreme Court developed a new
canon of statutory interpretation: the Court will assume that a
statute applies domestically unless Congress specifies otherwise.97
The creation of this canon should be praised. Justice Thomas is
correct in his dissent that this will impose a burden on Congress,9"
but it will provide notice to Congress that the Senators and Repre-
sentatives must legislate with a certain amount of specificity to
prevent similar issues from being subjected to the interpretation
of the Court. Unfortunately, the majority's conclusion - that the
"convicted in any court" language of § 922(g)(1) does not apply to
foreign convictions - is not so praiseworthy.
The majority proclaimed that the innovative assumption applied
to the "convicted in any court" language would be revised only if
the statutory language, history, or objective exposed the intention
of Congress.99
The majority's declaration that discrepancies are caused when
reading the statute as to include foreign convictions is correct;
however, the majority failed to acknowledge the dangerous
anomalies created by interpreting the statute without the inclu-
sion of foreign convictions. °0 Justice Thomas logically noted that
"the majority's interpretation permits those convicted overseas of
murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, terrorism, and other dangerous
crimes to possess firearms freely in the United States."1' The ma-
96. S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Senator DeWine). This statute would
alter § 922(g) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
who has been convicted- (A) in any court within the United States, of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; or (B) in any court
outside the United States, of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment ex-
ceeding one year (except for any crime involving the violation of an antitrust
law), if the conduct giving rise to the conviction would be punishable in any
court within the United States by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year
had such conduct occurred within the United States.
Id.
97. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755-56.
98. Id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "This new 'assumption' imposes a clear state-
ment rule on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a statute refers to nothing outside the
United States." Id.
99. Id. at 1756 (majority opinion).
100. Compare id. at 1756 (discussing that "if read to include foreign convictions, the
statute's language creates anomalies"), with id. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that "[e]ven assuming that my reading of the statute generates anomalies, the major-
ity's reading creates ones even more dangerous"). See supra notes 26, 52-53 and accompa-
nying text.
101. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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jority's argument is further weakened by its silence as to whether
any of these discrepancies have ever occurred."2 Discrepancies are
generated regardless of whether foreign convictions are included
in the interpretation of § 922; thus, the statutory language is un-
clear as to the intent of Congress. However, far more dangerous
anomalies have been created by the majority's interpretation. ' 3
The legislative history of § 922 implies that Congress did not in-
tend to limit the application of the statute to convictions entered
in federal or state courts.' Congress considered defining the
statute as applying specifically to domestic convictions, but ulti-
mately settled on the "convicted in any court" language.0 5 Justice
Breyer rationalized that the language was changed for simplicity
reasons, but his argument was diminished by Justice Thomas's
illustration of how easily the language could have been revised to
sufficiently limit the statute to federal or state convictions.!06 The
decision to eliminate the limiting language of the statute suggests
that Congress intended the statute to apply to more than federal
or state convictions.
0 7
The objective of § 922 is the most evident expression of the in-
tention of Congress. Congress enacted this statute for the purpose
of "keep[ing] guns out of the hands of those who have demon-
strated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without
becoming a threat to society."' ° Justice Breyer conceded that
"[tihe statute's purpose does offer some support for a reading of
the phrase that includes foreign convictions," but argued that
102. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "[Tihe Court does not claim that
any of these few prosecutions has been based on a foreign conviction inconsistent with
American law." Id. "As far as anyone is aware, the handful of prosecutions thus far rested
on foreign convictions perfectly consonant with American law, like Small's conviction for
international gunrunning." Id.
103. Id. at 1764.
104. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. But see Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757
(majority opinion) ("The statute's legislative history confirms the fact that Congress did not
consider whether foreign convictions should or should not serve as a predicate to liability
under the provision here at issue.").
105. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
106. Compare Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757 (contending that the legislative history does not
show that the changes made to the current version of 922(g)(1) reflected an intention to
include foreign convictions, but, rather, for reasons of simplicity because the language
included the term "felony" which is defined differently among the states), with id. at 1765
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the limiting language could have been maintained
while eliminating problems that could have been caused by the term "felony" through the
language "convicted in any Federal or State court of a crime punishable by a term of im-
prisonment exceeding one year").
107. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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since there have only been a few instances where a foreign convic-
tion has served as the predicate offense, Congress likely did not
consider such convictions.0 9 However, the purpose of the statute
is unambiguous, and the fact that foreign convictions have only
served as predicate offenses on a few occasions is irrelevant.
Those convicted overseas are just as dangerous as those convicted
domestically; thus, the Court should have respected the purpose
and intention of Congress and prohibited all dangerous individu-
als from possessing firearms.
The current proposal that sits before the Senate Judiciary
Committee appears to be a logical solution. It extends the "con-
victed in any court" language to foreign convictions, but permits
those convicted overseas of antitrust crimes to possess guns do-
mestically."' Also, the foreign convictions are only applicable "if
the conduct giving rise to the conviction would be punishable in
any court within the United States by a term of imprisonment ex-
ceeding one year had such conduct occurred within the United
States.""' If enacted, this bill should solve the problems discussed
by the majority, while upholding the purpose for which § 922 was
enacted. Now, the responsibility rests with Congress to correct
the misinterpretation of § 922 by the United States Supreme
Court and prevent those "convicted in any court" from possessing
firearms.
Robert A. Bracken
109. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
110. S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Senator DeWine).
111. S.954.
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